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FEATURE COMMENT: U.S. Government 
To Award Billions Of Dollars In Contracts 
To Open Electronic Marketplaces 
To Government Customers—Though 
Serious Questions Remain
Proposals to the U.S. General Services Administra-
tion are due soon in a $6 billion procurement under 
which multiple no-cost contracts will be awarded to 
vendors that will open electronic marketplaces to 
federal users making micro-purchases (generally up 
to $10,000). Although federal purchase card holders 
have long been able to make micro-purchases with 
few regulatory constraints regarding competition, 
transparency or socioeconomic requirements, this 
new initiative appears likely to normalize and ex-
pand those purchases—and so may revolutionize 
small purchases in the federal market.
Launch of the Electronic Marketplaces 
Initiative—The electronic marketplaces initia-
tive launched with a mandate from Congress for 
GSA to assess and use e-marketplaces in federal 
procurement, under § 846 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018, 
P.L. 115-91. See Yukins, “Two U.S. Initiatives on
a Collision Course: Trump’s Buy American Order
and the New Electronic Marketplaces,” 6 Pub.
Proc. L. Rev. (Thomson Reuters, forthcoming 2019).
Congress called for action in part because Amazon
and other online vendors so dominate commercial
marketplaces. There seemed little reason for the
Government to be left behind, especially since
GSA’s own studies have shown that federal buyers
are already using Government-issued purchase
cards to make hundreds of millions of dollars in
The GovernmenT 
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purchases from online commercial marketplaces 
every year.
The initial legislation prompted concern in the 
federal procurement community, especially among 
small businesses that feared being displaced by 
large electronic marketplaces. Congress followed up 
with § 838 of the NDAA for FY 2019, P.L. 115-232, 
which bars misuse of sales data and is discussed 
further below. Beyond minimal statutory guidance, 
however, Congress has left it to GSA to develop the 
electronic marketplaces, and—importantly—there 
has been no new regulatory effort to shape these 
billions of dollars in purchases. 
It is difficult to gauge how large these electronic 
marketplaces may grow. GSA believes that the elec-
tronic marketplaces will carry $6 billion in annual 
sales, but that estimate may prove low. In FY 2014, 
federal buyers made an estimated $17 billion in 
micro-purchases, at a much lower micro-purchase 
limit ($3,500 versus the current $10,000). See 
Government Purchase Cards: Little Evidence of Po-
tential Fraud Found in Small Purchases, But Docu-
mentation Issues Exist (GAO-17-276), available at 
www.gao.gov/assets/690/682770.pdf. Moreover, be-
cause the electronic marketplaces will offer buyers 
and sellers structured platforms with relatively few 
requirements regarding transparency, competition 
or accountability (discussed below), vendors may 
crowd into the electronic marketplaces, and federal 
purchasers may shift from other vehicles (such as 
the GSA and Veterans Affairs schedule contracts, 
currently a nearly $50 billion marketplace) for low-
value sales. The new electronic marketplaces thus 
may “swallow” a large portion of the bottom tiers of 
the $550 billion federal market.
GSA’s Evolving Plans—In the initiative’s 
first stage, in March 2018 GSA published a report 
which explained three paths that the Government 
could take to use e-marketplaces: the Government 
could use existing commercial marketplaces (such 
as Amazon.com or Walmart.com), the Government 
could use the technology that powers those mar-
ketplaces (to enhance, for example, GSA’s unwieldy 
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gsaadvantage.gov), or Government users could pur-
chase directly from online vendors. See GSA, Pro-
curement Through Commercial E-Commerce Portals 
Implementation Plan, at 18 (March 2018), available at 
interact.gsa.gov/blog/welcome-commercial-platform-
initiative-group.
In a follow-up report in April 2019, GSA an-
nounced that it would follow the first option: to 
contract with existing marketplaces (also known as 
electronic “platforms,” or “e-platforms”). See GSA, 
Procurement Through Commercial E-Commerce Por-
tals—Phase II Report: Market Research & Consulta-
tion (April 2019) (GSA Phase II Report), available at 
interact.gsa.gov/blog/welcome-commercial-platform-
initiative-group. This approach—to use existing on-
line marketplaces—holds substantial advantages for 
GSA. It will allow GSA to collect a “referral” fee of .75 
percent (or roughly $45 million in fees on $6 billion 
in sales) for purchases by Government users through 
the online marketplaces, while avoiding the costs and 
risks of improving Government portals, or of relying 
on transactions through individual vendors’ websites. 
GSA’s plan has met with concerns from Capitol 
Hill. In § 891 of the U.S. House of Representatives’ 
version of the pending NDAA for FY 2020, H.R. 
2500 (passed by the House on July 12, 2019), and 
in the House committee report which accompanied 
that bill, H. Rep. No. 116-120, 116th Cong., 1st 
Sess., pp.178–79 (June 19, 2019), the House Armed 
Services Committee, concerned by objections to the 
commercial marketplaces, called for GSA to revert 
to an approach which would assess all three models 
through pilots. 
Nonetheless, GSA has proceeded with its pilot 
initiative to award contracts for electronic market-
places. GSA issued a draft request for proposals in 
mid-2019, No. 47QSCC19R0429, and published a 
final solicitation, No. 47QSCC20R0001 (available on 
www.fbo.gov) for which proposals are due on Nov. 1, 
2019. Under GSA’s final solicitation, multiple no-cost 
contracts for three years (base plus two option years) 
will be awarded to electronic marketplaces offering 
diverse goods (and not services) that are commercial 
off-the-shelf items. Like the draft GSA solicitation, 
§ C.6 of the final GSA solicitation left open the pos-
sibility of reopening the competition later to admit
additional platforms. Per the Statement of Objectives
(SOO) of the final solicitation, any Government of-
ficial holding GSA’s Government-wide purchase card
(which requires training and authorization, see, e.g.,
Federal Acquisition Regulation subpt. 13.3) will be
able to purchase through the electronic marketplaces.
Concerns Under the Final Solicitation—As 
noted, despite concerns about these new electronic 
marketplaces, there has been no new regulatory effort 
to guide this initiative. GSA has solicited public com-
ments at several junctures, but those comments have 
not formed a coherent, binding body of regulations to 
govern this new multi-billion-dollar market. As a re-
sult, while the final solicitation followed the expected 
trajectory—contracts will be awarded to vendors that 
host commercial electronic marketplaces for micro-
purchases by federal users—GSA’s final solicitation 
still left unresolved a number of concerns:
• Micro-Purchases May Climb Well Beyond
$10,000: While the solicitation states that the
new electronic marketplaces are to be used, at
least on a pilot basis, only for micro-purchases,
those purchases will not necessarily be limited
to the current general micro-purchase limit of
$10,000. E.g., FAR 2.101; William Clark, Chair,
Civilian Agency Acquisition Council, Memo-
randum for Civilian Agencies: Class Deviation
from the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
Increasing the Micro-Purchase Threshold
(Feb. 16, 2018). Micro-purchases for special
purposes—contingency operations abroad,
for example—can reach much higher levels,
see, e.g., U.S. Department of Defense, Defense
Pricing and Contracting (DPC), Government
Purchase Card: Frequently Asked Questions
(summary table of micro-purchase thresholds
for Defense Department acquisitions), www.
acq.osd.mil/dpap/pdi/pc/faq.html; 61 GC
¶ 147, and GSA has urged Congress to increase
the standard micro-purchase limit to $25,000
for GSA-approved electronic portals, see GSA
Phase II Report, supra, at 4.
• No Mandates for Rigorous Competition or
Transparency: In accordance with FAR pt. 13’s
minimal requirements for micro-purchases,
GSA’s final solicitation does not require rigor-
ous competition or transparency for orders
in the new electronic marketplaces. Instead,
without notice to the broader commercial
market, federal purchasers will only need to
review two competing items on the market-
places, and will need to be able to document
that review (perhaps through something as
simple as a recorded “screen shot” of an offered
item). See SOO § 4.B. Users need not purchase
the least expensive item; indeed, the only pric-
ing requirement is the cursory review of two
items. There will be no published notice of
Vol. 61, No. 38 / October 16, 2019 
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the purchases, and there is no indication that 
sales data (which might, for example, show 
patterns of imprudently costly purchases), 
though required for purchasers, agencies and 
GSA, see SOO § 4.C, will be published outside 
the Federal Government. As a practical matter, 
the billions of taxpayer dollars spent through 
the new marketplaces may prove to be largely 
invisible to the taxpayers who contributed 
those funds, and to the broader commercial 
marketplace that might otherwise compete for 
those purchases.
• No Guarantee That Socio-Economic Goals
Will Be Met: Because of the way goods will be
bought in these new electronic marketplaces—
direct micro-purchases by Government users—
there will be little, if any, formal acquisition
planning process. Users will simply search,
click and buy. As a result, socio-economic goals
in procurement that normally are resolved in
the planning process—purchasing from small
or disadvantaged businesses, for example, or
accessibility requirements—may not be fully
addressed. Proponents of the new electronic
marketplaces may argue, though, that these
concerns are overstated, because only micro-
purchases will be made through these new
marketplaces, and micro-purchases are already
exempt from almost all procurement require-
ments, including socio-economic requirements.
See FAR 13.201(d). Proponents are also likely
to note that GSA’s final solicitation calls for
items on the marketplace to be identified and
searchable as eligible under special Govern-
ment preferences (such as AbilityOne), see
SOO § 4.A, and AbilityOne items will not be
easily replaceable by “essentially the same”
items on the new platforms, see SOO § 4.B.
Those limited measures aside, however, indi-
vidual Government purchasers ultimately will
be responsible for honoring these special pref-
erences, per attachment 2 to the solicitation.
As a practical matter, therefore, as these new
electronic marketplaces gain momentum and
more small procurements shift to these vehi-
cles, and as the centrifugal forces of the market
disperse purchasing authority to potentially
unaccountable individual users, regularized
purchases through the electronic marketplaces
may displace traditional purchases from small
and disadvantaged businesses, and other socio-
economic goals of the Federal Government
in procurement—such as the accessibility of 
information technology and environmental 
sustainability—may lose traction.
• No Domestic Content Requirements: Given the
Trump administration’s emphasis on “Buying
American,” one notable socio-economic casu-
alty of the new marketplaces may be domestic
preferences. See, e.g., Yukins, Feature Com-
ment, “Trump Executive Order Calls For More
Aggressive Use Of The Buy American Act—An
Order Likely To Have More Political Than
Practical Effect,” 61 GC ¶ 219. Because only
micro-purchases are allowed in the new mar-
ketplaces, and micro-purchases are exempt
from the Buy American Act, see FAR 13.201;
FAR 25.100, and generally fall anyway below
the Trade Agreements Act monetary thresh-
olds, see FAR 25.402, it appears that none of
the normal domestic preferences (or exclusions
of foreign goods) will apply to purchases in the
new marketplaces. As a result, GSA’s solicita-
tion notes that users of the new marketplaces
“may consider”—but apparently are not bound
by—an item’s country of origin. The practical
effect may be striking: for example, users may
be able to buy Chinese goods directly through
the new electronic marketplaces, though
Chinese goods traditionally would have faced
severe price discrimination under the Buy
American Act, and could have been barred
entirely under larger procurements by the
Trade Agreements Act (since China has not yet
joined a trade agreement covering procurement
trade with the United States). See Yukins and
Green, International Trade Agreements and
U.S. Procurement Law (2018), ch. 9 to The Con-
tractor’s Guide to International Procurement
(ABA 2018) (Erin Loraine Felix & Marques
Peterson, eds.), draft available at ssrn.com/
abstract=3443244.
• Security Review, But Without Published Stan-
dards: Much as the lack of acquisition plan-
ning in the new electronic marketplaces may
impede socio-economic goals, so too may the
Government’s acute security concerns—the
need to exclude items that pose cybersecu-
rity risks, for example—be exacerbated by the
new marketplaces. GSA’s pending solicitation
excludes a limited list of targeted compa-
nies that are considered high-risk, such as
Kaspersky Lab and Huawei. Section E.3.8 of
the solicitation goes a step further, however,
 The Government Contractor ®
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and may make proposals subject to review 
and potential rejection by a new interagency 
council established under 41 USCA § 1322, the 
Federal Acquisition Security Council (FASC). 
(The FASC only recently held its first meeting. 
See Rick Weber, “Federal Acquisition Security 
Council, Created Under 2018 Tech Law, Holds 
First Meeting,” Inside Defense, May 2, 2019.) 
GSA’s final solicitation does not specify what 
standards the FASC will apply in rejecting 
proposals, however, which raises serious ques-
tions under the FAR, see, e.g., FAR 15.203, and 
indeed under basic international norms for 
anti-corruption, see UN Convention Against 
Corruption, Art. 9.1(c) (parties are to ensure 
the “use of objective and predetermined crite-
ria for public procurement decisions, in order 
to facilitate the subsequent verification of the 
correct application of the rules or procedures”). 
While the Government may argue that its 
national security determinations should enjoy 
deference, recent controversies surrounding 
the Trump Administration’s alleged confla-
tions of private, political and national security 
interests may mean that less deference will be 
afforded here. The FASC review of proposals 
under GSA’s final solicitation—a review which 
apparently will focus on proposals at contract 
inception—also may divert attention from an 
ongoing risk during contract administration 
that dangerous goods and suppliers may be 
added to the electronic marketplaces after 
contracts are awarded. Although GSA’s final 
solicitation warns that the new electronic mar-
ketplaces “shall employ effective supply chain 
risk management processes and controls,” see 
SOO § 4.B, the electronic marketplaces will 
be allowed to follow their normal commercial 
practices for “on-boarding” new vendors—
standard practices which some may argue do 
not screen adequately for security risks to the 
Government.
• No Clear Pathway to Protest: Those seeking to
stop protests (challenges) to purchases under
the new contracts may argue that the new
contracts are indefinite-delivery, indefinite-
quantity (IDIQ contracts, sometimes known
as “framework agreements” or catalogue con-
tracts), and so purchases under the new con-
tracts (since below the monetary thresholds
for task-order protests) are not protestable
per FAR 16.505(a)(10). On the other hand,
GSA’s final solicitation does not term these 
IDIQ contracts and emphasizes in attachment 
1 that federal customers, when purchasing 
through the new electronic marketplaces, will 
be entering into separate contracts—which 
suggests that the purchases will not be orders 
under IDIQ contracts, and so will not be sub-
ject to the task-order protest bar. Resolving 
these issues of protestability will be important 
going forward, if accountability issues emerge 
in purchasing through the electronic market-
places.
• Potential	Liability	Under	 the	GSA	FSS	Price
Reduction Clause: GSA’s Federal Supply
Schedule (FSS) contracts still often rely on
a most-favored-customer provision, the Price
Reduction clause, GSAR 552.238-81, to ensure
that GSA FSS customers receive reason-
able pricing. Under that clause, commercial
sales below the GSA FSS price may violate
the most-favored-customer commitment, and
thus may trigger a price reduction (or even a
fraud action) under the FSS contract. Notably,
§ 4.D of GSA’s final solicitation for electronic
marketplaces warns that “commercial sales
through the e-marketplace could trigger the
Price Reduction Clause based upon the terms
[and] conditions of that individual supplier’s
FSS contract”—a potentially serious concern
for vendors using both the GSA schedules and
the new GSA electronic marketplaces as sales
vehicles. This risk is further complicated by §
B.1 of the GSA solicitation, which says that
“items sold to Government agencies through
the awarded contracts are to be provided at
commercial B2B [business-to-business] pricing
or better”—thus suggesting that the electronic
marketplace pricing is to fall below vendors’
commercial pricing, which in practice (depend-
ing on the terms of vendor’s schedules contract)
may trigger the FSS Price Reduction clause.
• Vendor	Data	May	Be	Misappropriated: Al-
though Congress mandated that data gathered
from federal sales in the electronic marketplac-
es not be misused, and GSA’s final solicitation
bars misuse of the data, see SOO § 4.C, some
in the vendor community remain concerned
that those running the electronic marketplaces
could in fact capture vendor data regarding
sales on the marketplaces, and use that data to
divert future sales to themselves. The Coalition
for Government Procurement has urged that
Vol. 61, No. 38 / October 16, 2019 
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this is a potential organizational conflict of 
interest, and the GSA final solicitation requires 
offerors of electronic marketplaces to submit 
plans to address this risk—a risk that may 
have to be assessed further as the electronic 
marketplaces pilot progresses. 
Conclusion—GSA’s final solicitation stressed 
that awards for the new electronic marketplaces will 
be driven by “user experience,” which is a reflection, 
in part, of the frustration many federal users have 
with traditional procurement methods. While the 
new marketplaces promise users flexibility and re-
sponsiveness, the electronic marketplaces initiative 
is in many ways a radical departure from traditional 
contracting—an outsourcing of the procurement 
function without much of the transparency, competi-
tion and accountability that normally protect federal 
purchasing. Members of the federal procurement 
community (and the broader procurement community 
around the world) are likely to watch this pilot closely, 
to determine whether the efficiency gains outweigh 
the significant concerns that surround these new 
marketplaces.
F
This Feature Comment was written for The Gov-
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School in Washington, D.C.
